A theory that provides intuitive understanding of a process a s complex as simultaneous political regime transition and growth in economic income would be a valuable addition to Political Science. In this paper, I attempt to provide such an explanation by emplo ying simple insights from evolutionary game theory and developing their application to politico-economic transitions by borrowing freely from various other bodies of literature including economic growth, spatial voting models, and comparative politics. The result is a theoretical frame that comfortably deals with transition as a relatively smoother dynamic and provides some explanation for how regime transition might occur. It also provide's an example of a learning strategy for politicians, which generates the credibility required for successful economic reform and a rationale for democratization.
How to Cite
Goorha, P., (2004) “POLITICO-ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS”, American Review of Political Economy 2(2). doi: https://doi.org/10.38024/arpe.79