KALEÇKI’S MICROECONOMICS RECONSIDERED

Abstract

Kaleçki’s microeconomics is recast in a strategic framework. The transformation is made in two steps. First, the relationship between capitalist and worker is modeled as a cooperative game. It is shown that the outcome is ‘more favorable’ to the capitalist than any other point on the payoff frontier. The game is then converted into a perfectly antagonistic game. The saddle-point is shown to be the outcome of a capitalist maximization problem

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Correa R., (2002) “KALEÇKI’S MICROECONOMICS RECONSIDERED”, American Review of Political Economy 1(1). doi: https://doi.org/10.38024/arpe.69

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Romar Correa (University of Mombai, India)

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

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