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Nationalism as a Response to Worker Militancy

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Abstract

"Peoples involved in civil strife... acquire peace at home through making war abroad" (Friedrich Hegel 1821, 295).

Nationalism is widely understood as a product of the nineteenth century, the doctrinal seeds for which were planted by the American Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution. It is an extension of tribalism to the nation and is understandable in terms of human evolution. It could be serviceable to first tribes and then nations as a means for acquiring social cohesion and domestic peace by convincingly identifying a foreign menace. But what explains the varying intensity of this strategy in modern times? This article claims that strengthening of nationalism's expression has been substantially due to the threat to elites posed by the rise of powerful worker movements which gained increasing militancy during nineteenth century industrialization. Nationalism served to deflect attention from a system that workers found unjust to foreign forces as the cause of their malaise. In this expression, nationalism served as an ideology enabling the more powerful to assuage worker discontent and continue gaining at the expense of the weaker.

Keywords: Group loyalty, Ideology, worker militancy, patriotism.

Classification Codes: B52, J5, N4.

I. Introduction: The Theoretical Setting

Scholars typically view nationalism as arising in the nineteenth century with roots in the American Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution (Roeder 2007, 5–6). It has been understood as the identification of a population that constitutes "the nation" as a true sovereign people, standing against external foes or those internally presumed to be in some sense foreign and a threat (Heiskanen 2020, 2). Although "The overwhelming majority of scholars associate nationalism with modernity" (Conversi 2012, 13), in the broadest sense, it is an extension of tribalism to the nation and is understandable in terms of human evolution. Nationalism can be serviceable to a nation, as it had been for tribes, as a means for acquiring social cohesion and domestic peace to better meet both the challenge of a foreign menace and the problem of material scarcity.

Although students of nationalism have viewed it as providing social unity, and especially as uniting all classes in a struggle against foreign, or even domestic enemies, little attention has been given to how, in its most vibrant expressions, it has served as an ideology in response to increasing worker militancy in the nineteenth century that threatened elites and the states they predominantly controlled.

Nationalism has, nonetheless, been characterized as an ideology, albeit not explicitly in its functioning to quell worker militancy. Sociologist and historian Anthony D. Smith, for instance, defines nationalism as "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential 'nation' " (2010, 9). Historian Daniele Conversi reports that, "there is some agreement that nationalism is an ideological movement" (2012, 13). Social psychologist Michael Billig contends that nationalism has been "the most successful ideology in human history" (1995, 22). Historian Willie Thompson

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concurs: "Nationalism has proved to be the most pervasive of modern ideologies, generating a sense of identity and loyalty across wide spectra of society, and it has a clear quasi-religious dimension" (2015, 150).

This article agrees that nationalism can serve as ideology, but not that it always does so. It has especially performed an ideological function when used to deflect attention from exploitation in a domestic system that workers found unjust, to foreign forces as the cause of their abject conditions. This article claims that it was the rise of powerful worker movements, exhibiting increasing militancy during the nineteenth century and thereby threatening elites' privileges, that explains the strengthening and varying intensity of expressions of nationalist ideology. It is in this context that nationalism served as an ideology by enabling the more powerful to assuage workers and continue to gain at their expense. This article takes issue with the resistance sometimes expressed on the left to the claim that workers can be duped by nationalist ideology.[1]

This worker militancy arose with industrialization and urbanization and thus in part underlays why nationalism is associated with modernity. Scholars have also, as will be discussed below, used the term ideology in very general terms as opposed to following the more specific meaning expressed by Karl Marx whereby it relates to doctrines legitimating the elites' exploitation of workers – persuading workers that the prevailing system, no matter how unequal, is in everyone's best interest.

By the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, workers in advanced industrial societies had gained the political power to use the state to advance their collective interests on an unprecedented scale. In response to their threats of insurrection, the state was transformed from what Marx called the executive committee of the ruling class[2] to that social agency that could limit, or in the extreme, eliminate the capturing by elites of disproportionate shares of income, wealth, and privilege. Without revolution, the working class had gained limited democracy with the male franchise, and consequently, possessing the overwhelming percent of votes, attained in principle the power to rewrite the social script.[3] That workers did not fully or even substantially rewrite the script in their favor is testament to the power elites retained over ideology.

Since the late eighteenth century, laissez-faire ideology has served as the dominant doctrine legitimating an exploitative capitalist economy. Virulent nationalism supplemented this legitimation. As noted above, it arose in response, albeit perhaps not consciously contrived, to the upwelling of working-class protest and threats to the established order. Nationalist sentiments rechanneled worker rage from their domestic exploitation to alleged foreign enemies. The success of this ideology accorded with the doubt cast by Thorstein Veblen on Marx's expectation that workers would overthrow capitalism, suggesting instead that they might "sink their force in the broad sands of Patriotism" (1919, 442).

This article explores the manner in which nationalism served as an ideological response to increasing worker militancy by deflecting workers' attention from exploitative social conditions to alien forces, whether foreign or domestic. It begins by examining the dynamics of ideology and then turns to how group loyalty came forth in human evolution. It then unfolds in greater detail the manner in which nationalism emerged from the threat posed by workers to elites' privileges and the state that protected them during the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centuries. Attention is then given to the ebb and flow of nationalist sentiment and worker power containment during the course of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The article ends with final reflections on the challenge of nationalism as ideology to worker democratic aspirations.

II. The Dynamics of Ideology

During the first 97-98 percent of human existence as foragers and then pre-state agriculturalists, little exploitation due to economic and political inequality existed (Boehm 1997). However, the rise of civilization and the state in

[1] For instance, politician and Marxist theorist Otto Bauer claimed in 1924 that the working class was immune to nationalist ideology: "There is no class that is inwardly more completely free from national valuation than the proletariat that has been freed from all tradition by the destructive power of capitalism" (quoted in Fuchs 2018, 16).

[2] Although the idea that historically the state served as handmaiden to the wealthy is generally associated with Marx, Adam Smith made this claim much earlier:

> "Laws and government may be considered in this and indeed in every case as a combination of the rich to oppress the poor, and preserve to themselves the inequality of the goods which would otherwise be soon destroyed by the attacks of the poor, who if not hindered by the government would soon reduce the others to an equality with themselves by open violence" (1763, 208).

[3] As Political scientist, Charles Boix puts it, "Democracy is a mechanism of decision in which, to a large extent, everything is up for grabs at each electoral contest. The majority of the day may choose to redraw property rights or alter the institutional and taxation landscape, thus dramatically reorganizing the entire social and economic fabric of the country" (2006, 4).

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Eurasia about 5,500 years ago, following upon a warrior elite's command of superior metal weaponry (Boix 2015) and military organization, permitted them to take control of resources, predominantly land, and force all others to work with the elite's resources or starve. They were subjugated to do so as slaves, serfs, indentured peasants, or in indentured servitude. The elite's strong comparative advantage in violence and its ownership and control of productive wealth permitted them to extract virtually all surplus from producers, typically leaving producers with the mere wherewithal to meet subsistence needs.

Among hunter-gatherers and pre-state agriculturalists, religion served to reinforce their economic and political equality. But religion became transformed with the rise of the state to serve as ideology legitimating the prevailing highly unequal social order (e.g., divine right to rule or even rulers as themselves gods; static social relations as determined by celestial forces and not to be changed). Throughout civilized history, the elite's superior influence over the generation and character of ideology has played a usually decisive role in the maintenance of their ability to control producers and appropriate their surplus. Beyond violence, ideology has always been their most powerful and ever-present political weapon (Wisman 2022).

Ideology is an aspect of legitimation. Legitimation refers to a set of beliefs concerning the nature of reality. It concerns how people mentally experience and understand their world. As such, it is neither positive nor negative. Humans evolved such that they must give meaning to their world (Berger and Luckmann 1967). Ideology is a specific expression of legitimation in which reality is mystified by presenting a false view of social relations that enables the more powerful to benefit at the expense of the weaker. It is deception, although not usually conscious deception.

This use of the term ideology follows that of Marx, as opposed to its virtual loss of specific meaning in modern discourse. As Daniel Bell put it, "In the twenty-five years since [his book] *The End of Ideology* was published, the concept of ideology has unraveled completely. What is considered an ideology today? Ideas, ideals, beliefs, creeds, values, Weltanschauungen, religions, political philosophies, systems, linguistic discourses - all have been pressed into service" (1988, 321). Although Marx's theory of ideology is often dismissed as merely exhibiting his political biases, economist Joseph Schumpeter, from the other end of the political spectrum, thought otherwise: "Marx was the economist who discovered ideology for us and who understood its nature. Fifty years before Freud, this was a performance of the first order" (1954, 35).

As has been recognized by social thinkers since Machiavelli, elite control can be maintained by either physical or ideological force. Physical force has often been necessary for initially establishing and solidifying a hierarchical social structure. However, brute force is relatively inefficient in that it generates strong resentment, the constant threat of insurrection, and is costly in terms of policing. A far more efficient and effective long-run strategy is for elites to embrace an ideological system that convinces not only themselves but all beneath them of the moral and functional appropriateness of the existing social order. Those below are led to believe that their lesser status in terms of income, wealth, and privilege is as it must be.

The fact that ideologies benefit elites does not mean that elites sit around tables and craft clever doctrines to justify their privileges and pacify those they exploit, although on occasion they might do just that. More likely is that they embrace those ideas floating around in social thought-space that serve their interests. The metaphor of biological evolution is helpful for clarifying the process by which this occurs.[4]

Ideas are in a constant state of evolution. As genetic mutations continually occur in the biological world, so too do new ideas--mutated thoughts--continually spring forth within social-thought space. In both domains, almost all mutations are condemned to perish. They do not find adequately nourishing environmental niches to enable survival and reproduction. Most biological mutations make their carriers less fit for their environments. Similarly, most new ideas are seen by others as uninteresting or outlandish. Thus, either the ideas are ignored or those expressing them are mocked or even persecuted (imprisoned, tortured, burnt at the stake). But occasionally a mutation emerges into a nourishing environmental niche, survives, and spreads. Because cultural change is generally far more rapid than biological change, new cultural niches are more frequently created, offering potentially fertile environments for new ideas, institutions, and practices. Thus, social and cultural evolution can make room for ideologies that serve convincingly to legitimate the power and privilege of elites. Elites did not so much create their privilege-legitimating ideologies as pick up the serviceable ones from their culture's swirl of ideas.

Within this evolutionary metaphor, an ideology that legitimates hierarchy and inequality would not only be readily embraced as true by its privileged beneficiaries, but surprisingly perhaps even more readily accepted as

[4]The metaphor of ideas evolving by a process paralleling genetic evolution was expressed by Herbert Spencer in *A System of Synthetic Philosophy - First Principles,* published in 1910 (2008). It was expressed more recently by Richard Dawkins in *The Selfish Gene* (1976). Dawkins proposed the word *meme* as a basic unit of thought evolution to play a role similar to *gene* in biological evolution.

valid by its victims. A large study conducted by social psychologists John Jost *et al.* finds that, "contrary to their own self-interest, members of disadvantaged groups were more likely to provide ideological support for the system than were members of advantaged groups" (2003, 20).

The wealth, political power, superior education, and status of the elite, and thus their social influence, enable them to establish attitudes and social institutions that communicate their self-serving doctrines to those below. Further, research suggests that elites are especially adept at duping their victims. Cognitive psychologist Denise Cummins reports that "Social dominance has been found to correlate with deceptive ability and enhanced ability to decode nonverbal cues. Individuals who are perceived and rated as socially dominant are better at deceiving others, persuading others, and interpreting other's intentions" (2005, 682).

For subjugation of labor to be efficiently sustainable, workers must be led to believe that their inferior status in terms of income, wealth, and privilege is just and as it must be. And strikingly, Elizabeth Haines and John Jost find that "people may be more willing to accept relatively illegitimate accounts than is commonly assumed...[and the authors] found that people misremembered the explanations that were given to them as more legitimate than they actually were" (2000, 232). And, as Thorstein Veblen astutely observed, "The fact that the usages, actions, and views of the well-to-do leisure class acquire the character of a prescriptive canon of conduct for the rest of society gives added weight and reach to the conservative influence of that class. It makes it incumbent upon all reputable people to follow their lead" (1899, 200).

With the exception of periods of extreme crises, elite control has always been adequately legitimated such that most folks found it acceptable, even when it meant their lives were filled with extreme hardship and misery. This was especially true if all other sufferers remained quiescent. As Tolstoy famously noted, there are "no conditions of life to which a man cannot get accustomed, especially if he sees them accepted by everyone around him" (1961, 700).

During the greater part of history, an aristocracy controlled access to land and the dominant ideology legitimated their privileged position. Under capitalism, the owners of capital control access to the means of production and an ideology rose to dominance that legitimates the institutions and practices of capitalism (Wisman and Smith 2011; Wisman 2022). As worker militancy intensified during the nineteenth century, nationalism became an important component of that ideology.

III. On the Origins of Group Loyalty

Nationalism is rooted in the fact that humans evolved within groups in competition with each other, resulting in strong in-group cooperation and out-group enmity.[5] Competition among groups was frequent and ferocious. According to anthropologist Lawrence Keeley, 65 percent of pre-agricultural societies were at war continuously, and 87 percent fought more than once a year. As many as 10 percent of a band's population might perish in a single raid and about 30 percent of males were killed in warfare (about the same rate as for chimpanzees, human's nearest genetic relative) (1997, 174). Not surprisingly, then, society's members exhibit extraordinary commitment to the group during war or its threat, since a group for which such commitment is weak would be at a severe disadvantage in a struggle for resources, and therefore would be at a disadvantage in terms of survival, in passing its members' genes or culture on to progeny. Human sociability was selected in part as a result of the benefits of social cohesion during threat from external aggressors.[6] We also see the proclivity for group commitment in team sports, which incidentally evolved as training for war. For instance, rarely is anything really to be gained by spectators if their team wins, yet at times there is actual carnage among spectators not content with the run of the game. Clearly something primordial and non-rational is at play here.

Evolution may have selected a tendency always to locate an external foe to maintain group solidarity and reduce free-rider problems.[7] Societies rarely seem to be without one. For instance, in the U.S., the two great political

[5]The importance of group selection in human evolution is widely embraced today (e.g., D. S. Wilson 2015; Bowles and Gintis 2013a; Stoelhorst and Richerson 2013; Prum 2017). This dynamic had been recognized by Darwin: "A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection" (1871, 1:159–60).

[6]Anthropologist Keith F. Otterbein argues that political organization and war-making potential have developed in a process of mutual re-enforcement. Indeed, centralized authority appears to correlate with military efficiency (1970). Anthropologist Jared Diamond concurs: "...wars, or threats of war, have played a key role in most, if not all, amalgamations of societies" (1999, 291).

[7]This is the argument set forth by evolutionary biologist David Barash. Interestingly, he points out "the word 'Satan,' the chief evil spirit of Western religious belief...is derived from the same root in Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and Old English [wherein] Satan means adversary, opponent, enemy" (1994, 158).

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purges of the past century (the Red Scare of 1919-1920 and the McCarthy era of the 1950s) came in the wake of the two World Wars as the old enemies disappeared and the need for new ones came into force, especially in face of worker militancy.

Inflating a foreign menace could greatly benefit a leader, especially one suffering unpopularity. In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the *Chicago Daily News* proclaimed, "Thanks now to Japan, the deep division of opinion that has rent and paralyzed our country will be swiftly healed" (quoted in Dower 2010, 139). War historian John W. Dower remarks that just as December 7, 1941 was "a political godsend for President Roosevelt. . . September 11 proved to be a windfall for President Bush" (2010, 138).[8]

The utility to political leaders of a foreign threat creates the potential that they might provoke hostilities to gain support and deflect attention from exploitative social relationships or lack of freedoms.[9] Political scientist William Galston notes that ". . . the greatest challenges to constitutional democracy have always come during wars or national emergencies" (2018, 81).

But claims of a threat must be credible. If not, leaders may lose public support. President Lyndon Johnson's failure to convince the American public that military victory was essential to stop the spread of communism in South-East Asian spelt the end of his political career.

The allegation of a foreign menace need not be of a military threat. It can equally be presented as economic, as unfair foreign competition or immigrants threatening worker jobs and pushing down wages. The ideology of nationalism has been expressed in both forms and their combination. What is at issue is the diverting of workers' attention from their exploitation by their employers and the economic system to an alien menace.

IV. The Birth of Modern Nationalism

Although the rise of nation-states is generally dated to the end of the Middle Ages,[10] nations in their modern sense came into being in the late eighteenth century in Europe and North America (Mann 2012; Fuglestad 2021) and national consciousness among the masses only became widespread in the mid to late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries (Hobshawm 1992; Connor 2005; Ichijo and Uzelac 2005). Equally supportive of the thesis being developed here that nationalism was substantially a response to worker militancy, historian Michael Mann notes that European wars did not see the fervor of later conflicts among the broad population until sometime in the nineteenth century. For example, The Seven Years' War between Great Britain and France was popular among those with property in Great Britain, but it was not viewed as essential that the propertyless be organized to support the war (Mann 2012, 116).

Among those studying nationalism, there are three main schools of thought. Sociologist Ernest Gellner is widely viewed as the founder of the modernist approach, which informs much contemporary scholarly debate on nationalism (Ichijo and Uzelac 2005; Conversi 2012; Fuglestad 2021; Gellner 1983). Two other less influential schools of thought are primordialism, which argues that nationalism is intrinsic to human nature and can be found in antiquity, and ethno-symbolism, arguing that while nationalism may be a modern ideology, the most successful nations are built on pre-modern heritage (Ichijo and Uzelac 2005). Although these three schools do not emphasize nationalism as in part a response to worker militancy, they are not at odds with such a thesis. Due to its predominance, attention will be focused on Gellner's approach,

Nationalism for Gellner is produced by and becomes a part of modernity. It represents a fusion of the state and culture that is consequent to the rise of industrialization and its division of labor (Gellner 1983, 24–25). In contrast to the cultural homogeneity emphasized by elites in modern nations, ruling classes in premodern states and empires emphasized differentiation with the lower classes (Gellner 1983, 10). This is because before industrialization, "[n]o-one, or almost no-one, has an interest in promoting cultural homogeneity at this social level. The state is interested in extracting taxes, maintaining the peace, and not much else, and has no interest in promoting lateral communication between its subject communities" (Gellner 1983, 31). Historian John Breuilly (2005) comes to similar conclusions when examining the case of medieval and early modern England, finding that

> "nation, or rather national identify in the sense of certain processes for constructing national identity, existed only at the elite level, in discontinuous and fragmented forms, in two different worlds of meaning

[8] For an analysis of the political utility of 9/11, see Wisman 2014.

[9] This was a principal theme powerfully depicted fictionally in George Orwell's *Animal Farm* (1945) and then *1984* (1948).

[10] Economic historian Eric Jones characterizes the nation state as "a purely European form which has been exported to parts of the world that had hitherto known only tribalism" (1987, 127). The power of most earlier states varied inversely with distance from the capitol. The nation-state differs in that its law is practically as effective at the edges as at the center, favored by Europe's many natural geographic barriers.

> (the ethnographic and the political) which were connected only casually to each other, subordinate to Christian and dynastic principles, arguments and images, often marginalized when in conflict with Christian and dynastic concerns, and having little in the way of 'public culture' which could maintain, reinterpret and transmit national identity" (2005, 31).

A sense of national consciousness did not typically exist among subaltern peasants and workers (Mann 2012, 227; Gellner 1983, 13). Indeed, elites lived in relative cultural isolation from those below, precluding a shared culture in terms of the nation (Mann 1996). The masses were the object and not the source of political authority (Heiskanen 2020), and other means, such as the threat of violence or appeals to religion were the primary tools to maintain peace and prevent uprisings.

By the nineteenth century, nations were increasingly understood as including workers as well as elites, an understanding often crafted from some preexisting cultural elements and narratives. For Gellner, "it is nationalism that engenders nations, not the other way round" (1983, 55). In this functionalist view, industrial society requires cultural homogeneity, social mobility, and universal literacy, with nationalism providing the supporting ideological framework (Fuglestad 2021; Gellner 1983, 37–38). Additionally, nationalism serves to denote who should be considered among "the sovereign people" in a society (Heiskanen 2020, 2), and it can be useful for elites to embrace the concept of all in society as members of the same family. This fictional family forms an abstract nation where the state serves as father or mother (Mann 2012, 227).

Gellner did not identify the rising intensity of nationalism as serving an ideological function of deflecting worker outrage at their exploited condition to foreign forces – the thesis of this article. Instead, he notes that "nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases the totality, of the population." He stresses that "it is not the case that nationalism imposes homogeneity out of a willful cultural *Machtbedürfniss* [need for power]*;* it is the objective need for homogeneity which is reflected in nationalism" (1983, 57; 46). But he does not explicitly identify this need for homogeneity as resulting from a need to quell worker militancy. That is, Gellner viewed nationalism as a semi-spontaneous response created "by a fragmented social system disrupted by the uneven impact of industrialization. . . " (Conversi 2012, 16).

Gellner also notes that, in his model, "capital, ownership, and wealth were simply ignored, and deliberately so. These once so respected factors were replaced by another one, generically designated as access to education." (1983, 96). Conflict between workers and capitalists, in his view, occurs early and largely resolves itself. Or, as he notes:

> "our model assumes that a sharp polarization and social discontinuity does indeed occur in early industrialism, but that this then becomes attenuated by social mobility, diminution of social distance, and convergence of life-styles. It is not denied that great differences in ownership persist, but it suggests that the effective social consequences of this, both hidden and perceived, become very much less important" (1983, 96).

In this manner, Gellner looks past the possibility that nationalism was fueled by the need to redirect worker attention from their struggle with an economic system that presented them with a raw deal to foreign enemies. But, as will be seen below, nationalism was critically important in helping pacify worker ire at the low wages and squalid working and living conditions accompanying industrialization. It served as a convenient and effective ideology for tamping down workers' revolutionary zeal.

V. The Threat of Increasing Worker Unrest

Industrialization and urbanization accompanying nineteenth century economic growth increased the potential, as Marx anticipated, that the working class could organize and threaten violence against the elites' state for redress of their exploited conditions. Marx's understanding was already anticipated as early as the late eighteenth century when the seeds of nationalism were being planted. A contemporary of Adam Smith, philosopher and historian John Millar noted the greater facility provided by larger urban areas for worker revolts. In such settings

> "a great proportion of the people are easily roused by every popular discontent, and can unite with no less facility in demanding a redress of grievances. The least ground of complaint, in a town, becomes the occasion of a riot; and the flames of sedition spreading from one city to another, are blown up into a general insurrection" (quoted in Hirschman 1997, 90).

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The evolution of an urban industrial working class brought with it organized, at times violent, resistance to long workdays, low wages, child labor, and unhealthy working and living conditions. Nourishing their rebelliousness were visions produced by social thinkers such as Robert Owen, Sismondi, Saint Simon, Fourier, and Marx of how their lives could be radically better under altered social institutions. To reduce and hopefully eliminate the threat of violence, elites began bribing the working class with various benefits and with the franchise. Both strategies for calming working-class revolutionary fervor resulted in higher living standards for workers.

Although immediately costly to elites—lowering the amount of surplus they could appropriate – they realized that the alternative of violence and revolution promised to be far worse. They understood, as political scientists Edward Muller and Michael Seligson observe, that "the presence of meaningful nonviolent possibilities of influencing the political process will inhibit the ability of revolutionary-minded dissidents to mobilize large followings" (1987, 444).[11]

The following examples reveal the dynamics of the political response to the threat of worker insurrection and the resulting improvement in worker welfare. The initial extension of the franchise in Britain in 1832 followed, as economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson report, "unprecedented political unrest, including the Luddite Riots from 1811-1816, the Spa Fields Riots of 1816, the Peterloo Massacre in 1819, and the Swing Riots of 1832" (2000, 1182–83). To quell worker militancy, England introduced the 10-hour working day in 1847. Following the revolution of 1848, "Britain. . . was transformed from an 'oligarchy' run by an elite to a democracy" (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 1167). Further extension of the franchise in 1867 came with a heightened threat of violence due to a severe economic downturn. This was followed by lessened inequality and welfare measures paid for by the fact that "taxes as a proportion of National Product more than doubled in the 30 years following 1870, and then doubled again" (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 1191). These taxes fell most heavily upon elites.

Although universal male suffrage had been introduced by the French Revolution, in subsequent decades it was whittled down until, following the 1830 revolution, the Orleanist monarchy used property restrictions to limit it to a mere 0.75 percent of the male population. "In France in the 1830s and 1840s, the specter of a 'social conflagration' akin to Saint Bartholomew's Day in the Wars of Religion was frequently raised" (Rosanvallon 2013, 173). But the Revolution of 1848 was the big wakeup call for Europe's elites. It became clear that political reforms with distributional consequences had to be made to avoid a revolution that would abolish their privileges. In the wake of the 1848 revolution and the collapse of the Orleanist monarchy in 1849, male suffrage was again extended to all males. However, Napoleon III seized power and his "Bonapartism" appealed to nationalism to deflect worker disgruntlement. Nevertheless, continued concern about worker insurrection eventually forced France to create compulsory workmen's compensation insurance in 1898, requiring payment to injured workers regardless of fault.

In Germany, Otto von Bismarck's understanding of the need to appease workers to maintain social peace was already evident during the Revolution of 1848, when he proclaimed that "the factories enrich individuals, but they create a mass of poorly nourished proletarians, who by virtue of the insecurity of their existence have become a threat to the state" (quoted in J. Z. Muller 2003, 172). Soon thereafter, Germany also began extending the franchise. However, rather than further extending it several decades later in response to an increasingly threatening working class (organized under a socialist party), the elite chose instead to bribe them with extensive welfare measures. Germany's Social Democratic Party embraced a Marxist program in 1875. To counter its rising political challenge, Chancellor Bismarck set forth social measures between October 1878 and 1890 that served to defang the threat. Compulsory health insurance was instituted in 1883, paid for by both employers and workers. The following year, worker accident insurance was introduced, and in 1889, old-age insurance and mandatory retirement.

Over the following decades, other European countries introduced many of the same measures. Much of what had earlier been viewed as the domain of charity was taken over by the state and came to be seen as rights. The state presented itself as an agent for social solidarity.

Although workers were bought off, their welfare greatly improved. Extension of the franchise in response to threats of violence and revolution from below led to labor reform, and especially to a democratization of education. In England, for instance, enrollment of 10-year-olds soared from 40 percent in 1870 to 100 percent in 1900 (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 1191).

Even more striking was the dramatic improvement in health. Cleaner water and better nutrition as worker incomes rose enabled children to grow taller and stronger. This, combined with medical advances, enabled life expectancy at birth in England and Wales to increase from 40 in 1850 to 45 in 1900 to 70 by 1950 (Deaton 2013, 83,

[11]This possibility had been foreseen by De Tocqueville, who much earlier had noted how political inclusion of disgruntled groups served to quiet social resentment. He was well aware of how, when conservative elites in France had vociferously opposed extending the franchise, devastating urban riots followed (1835).

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91). Angus Deaton describes the political dynamic as follows: "Whenever health depends on collective action – whether through public works, the provision of health care, or education – politics must play a role. In this case, the (partial) removal of one inequality – that working people were not allowed to vote – helped remove another inequality – that working people had no access to clean drinking water" (2013, 98).

The progressive extension of the franchise to workers transformed the state from Marx's "executive committee of the ruling class" to a social agency with the ability to limit, or in the extreme case eliminate, the elites' appropriation of disproportionate shares of income, wealth, and privilege. The ease with which elites could use the state to violently curb the aspirations of workers, especially in putting down strikes, was diminished. Without revolution, the working class had in principle gained power to reconfigure society. That workers did not substantially do so is testament to the control elites retained over ideology. Only a powerful and convincing ideology could promise retention of their control over the state. Always before, excepting severe crises, they had been successful in convincing the producers below that what was more narrowly in the interests of elites was equally in the interests of the workers. But now the elites faced a new challenge. They could no longer as easily back up their ideology with violence. The elites had lost their violence-backed monopoly control over the state. Ideology would need play a fuller role in preserving their privileges. It is within this setting that nationalist and racist rhetoric became more widely and intensely expressed.

VI. Nationalism, Racism, and Protectionism as Ideology

The ideology that evolves to legitimate a social system in which an elite exploits workers is always complex, composed of many elements. Of these, the doctrine of laissez-faire has, since the early nineteenth century, played a dominant role in capitalist societies. It depicts private property and markets as institutions that generate economic dynamism, improving everyone's economic wellbeing, and making them free. With hard work anyone can become rich. All are responsible for their own fates. Moreover, wealthy elites are necessary because they save and invest in expanding productive wealth, creating employment, and raising wages.

However, as industrialization and urbanization created the potential for workers to organize and revolt for a better deal, the legitimacy of laissez-faire ideology weakened and was no longer sufficient for quelling their rage. Nationalism and racism got added to the ideological arsenal and served to limit elites' losses. For many workers, they deflected blame for their unhappy conditions from their exploitation by domestic elites to foreign enemies or domestic racial and ethnic minorities. This section surveys the rise of this ideology where worker rebelliousness was most menacing to elites and their state.

In all industrializing countries, immigrants were targeted as taking jobs from citizens and pushing down wages. In Great Britain, the focus was predominantly upon the Irish (Martin 2012), who made up the vast majority of immigrants between 1800 and 1945 (Panayi 2014, 23). In his influential 1839 pamphlet, "Chartism," that sought to explain the capitalist crisis in Britain from a conservative perspective, Thomas Carlyle argued that Irish immigration is "the sorest evil this country has to strive with," and the cause of worker unrest (quoted in Martin 2012, 23). The "Irish question" dominated British politics until the early 20th century, dividing the working class and impairing its political success in demanding a better deal (Wellhofer 1985, 979). The power of this ideology prompted Marx to believe that termination of Ireland's union with Great Britain was a necessary prerequisite to revolution by English workers (Martin 2012, 16).

In the 1860s, British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli advocated a means for reducing class strife that emphasized the need to stress national authenticity and to place blame for the low wages and poor working condition on foreigners, and especially immigrants and colonial subjects. He saw universal male suffrage as "moving the boundary line between 'citizens' and 'subjects' to the frontiers of nationality" (Balibar 1991, 210). Disraeli established the idea of One Nation Conservatism in which elites develop a paternalistic relationship with workers to better placate them. Additionally, historian Marika Sherwood finds that, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, elites embarked on a project to emphasize "Anglo-Saxonism," in which "all classes could be homogenized into a superior 'English race,' " in order to both justify the expansion of the British Empire and "appease and control an almost rebellious working class" (2001, 10).

France in the 1880s saw intensified xenophobia generated among workers amid an influx of Belgian, Spanish, and Italian workers. Historian Laurent Dornel describes the process through which "a new border was born, now clearly separating French workers and foreign workers... This distinction between national and foreign is also at the heart of the new democratic practices" (2007).[12] Nationalist ideology redirected workers' demands for

[12]*"à l'intérieur du pays, une nouvelle frontière est née, séparant désormais clairement ouvriers français et ouvriers étrangers...Cette distinction entre*

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a fairer share to an expression of national protectionism that took on a "violently xenophobic and anti-Semitic" character. As historian/sociologist Pierre Rosanvallon puts it, "The transition from revolutionary radicalism to ultranationalism was one of the period's most striking examples of ideological and political reclassification" (2013, 144). This ideology emphasized protecting "national labor" against immigrant workers and to give it substance it was proposed that employers using foreign workers be subject to a special tax. Street demonstrations grew in the 1890's with attacks on Italian immigrants and in the north of France, on Belgians. Although such actions were opposed by socialist parties and unions, they were powerless to stop them (Rosanvallon 2013, 147).

Germany saw a similar rise of xenophobic radical nationalism at this time, associated especially with militarism. Military and nationalist rituals and symbols permeated the newly united Germany. Militarism was deployed as ideology not just against ethnic minorities, but also leftist workers. Historian Roger Chickering writes that "in the eyes of Germany's civilian and military leaders, the spectre of conflict at home – class war and social revolution – justified expanding the definition of the 'enemy' to include members of the Social Democratic Party" (2008, 203).

Patriotic societies were established in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century such as the German Navy League (with over 1 million members) and the German Colonial Society with encouragement from commercial and industrial groups and the support of the government. These groups stoked ethnic tensions with Polish, French, and Danish minorities (Chickering 2008, 208), with national belonging being ethnicized and ethnic minorities increasingly marginalized (Conrad 2008, 231). The leaders of the patriotic societies were mostly men who owned property and often public officials. Chickering notes that they considered themselves

> "an academically educated and cultivated elite. . . [who were] sensitive barometers of threats to German culture and authority wherever those threats arose, whether in Germany itself, at the hands of Catholic Poles or atheistic socialists, or in the broader world, at the hands of Czechs in Bohemia, black Africans, or British imperialists. Radical nationalism represented the ideological vehicle of their claims to power" (2008, 210).

Notably, representatives of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) who had earlier adopted a Marxist program, gave their support to the First World War, demonstrating further evidence of the persuasiveness of nationalist ideology (Fuchs 2018, 17).

In the United States, worker protests were especially violent, with the state intervening to protect business interests, resulting in more workers killed during strikes in the U.S. than in any other country but Russia (Priestland 2012, 91). However, the foreign menace was mostly identified as ethnic and racial groups within the U.S. Success in dividing workers against themselves in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was made easier by the fact that many unions were largely made up of immigrants (Keeran 1998, 620). German Americans were especially well-represented in these groups, while other large blocks such as Irish immigrants and Black workers were largely excluded from socialist politics and trade unions (Buhle 2013, 79).

The influx of Chinese workers at the end of the nineteenth century in the West was met with racist resistance among white workers. In California, a referendum baring Chinese immigration passed with overwhelming support in 1879. Three years later, President Chester A. Arthur signed into law a prohibition barring all immigration of Chinese laborers into the U.S. Even members of the Workingmen's Party and Knights of Labor participated in physical attacks on Asian workers (Rosanvallon 2013, 163). Historian Paul Buhle notes that the German American core of the American labor movement also came to be targeted with xenophobic attacks in 1886, "surrounded by a wave of nativist hysteria whipped up by the government and the press. . . Activists also faced blacklisting in the workplace. No wonder they tended to stop talking a politics openly and to withdraw to their bases" (2013, 44).

Throughout this period, unions in the United States were divided with white, male, and American-born workers in "craft industries" commanding the highest pay and prestige. Their unions, largely led by nativist bosses, endeavored to enforce measures to preserve this hierarchy of workers (Buhle 2013, 36 and 124).

Until the mid-twentieth century, labor unions in the United States remained either racially segregated (the American Federation of Labor excluded non-white workers), or black and other nonwhite workers were relegated to the margins (as in the case of the Congress of Industrial Organizations). Although within these organizations, labor conflict was understood as primarily a struggle by white workers against capitalists (Hill 1996, 197 and 199), this conflict was often deflected to that with immigrants and minorities. The *United Mine Workers of America Journal*, for example, made a plea to its members in 1903: "Help us, *men and women of our race*, to win this fight," noting that "hordes of black, brown, yellow, and striped workers ... have not the slightest idea of the meaning of organization" (quoted in Hill 1996, 197). This expression of nationalism – identifying certain races and ethnicities as alien or

national et étranger est d'ailleurs au creux des nouvelles pratiques démocratiques" [authors' translation].

"foreign" and not authentically part of America -- precluded the unity of workers that might have produced a social safety net closer to that of Western European nations. In this manner, the effectiveness of turning workers against each other in terms of race and ethnicity has borne fruit for the elite.

Transnational research by economists Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser (2006) has found a strong correlation between social homogeneity and redistributive policies. The more heterogeneous the society, the less the expenditure on social programs. Further, "...across the United States, the states with the smallest percentage of African Americans in their population offer the most generous social benefits" (Rosanvallon 2013, 163). Offering support for these claims, activist and author Heather McGhee demonstrates that racism hurts non-wealthy white Americans, lowering their "support for government actions that could help them economically, out of a zero-sum fear that it could help the racialized 'undeserving' as well" (2021, 38).

Between 1879 and 1913, protectionism rose substantially in continental Europe (O'Rourke 2000). Protectionism is also an expression of nationalism that can generate social solidarity and patriotism. It can instill in workers a sense that their interests and those of the owners of the means of production are the same, as opposed to conflictual. This was starkly evident in the late decades of the nineteenth century in France, where "protectionism developed into a full-blown political culture. The movement had its newspapers, such as *Le Protectionniste* (1879) and *Le Travail national* (1884) and its champions" (Rosanvallon 2013, 141). It fed on the argument that protectionism protected the little guy, the workers' wages and farmers' prices. The larger goal "was to establish a national identity that could compensate for social divisions.... The split between capital and labor [could] be replaced by a new idea of collective solidarity against a foreign threat" (Rosanvallon 2013, 141).

Another face of nationalism was imperialism. Cecil Rhodes famously proclaimed, "He who would avoid civil war must be an imperialist" (quoted in (Rosanvallon 2013, 142).[13] As Rosanvallon puts it, "Colonialism...counterbalanced and camouflaged domestic inequalities by depicting the nation as a community in confrontation with the rest of the world" (2013, 143).

As noted earlier, patriotism and war have always served to unify people with divergent interests, and rulers rarely achieve as high a degree of loyalty from their followers during peace as during war. Consequently, facing severe worker insurrection, political leaders representing the interests of the elite might be tempted to craft measures against other powers to provoke a limited amount of real threat. Biologist John Alcock argues that this temptation evolved because of its social utility. Thus, "paradoxically, war depends on the cooperative, group-bonding, authority-accepting aspect of human behavior" (1978, 24–25). A century ago, journalist Randolph Bourne observed that "War is the health of the state....A people at war become in the most literal sense obedient, respectful, trustful children again, full of that naïve faith in the all-wisdom and all-power of the adult who takes care of them....dissent is like sand in the bearings" (quoted in Bacevich 2013, B3). Historian Volker Berghahn claims that pre-World War I Germany's ruling elite became increasingly war-like in part to deflect and mollify the growing challenge of Germany's working class movement (1993).

VII. The Opportune Ideology of Social Darwinism

Nationalism was not the only doctrine added to the elite's ideological arsenal that served to combat rising worker militarism. The doctrine of Social Darwinism also rose to prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century as worker militancy intensified. Like nationalism, it served to weaken the potential for worker solidarity. Social Darwinism's greatest spokesman was Herbert Spencer, a fierce advocate of laissez-faire, limited government, and opponent of social welfare. It depicted society as naturally competitive, and if this competitiveness could be unfettered much as laissez-faire doctrine insisted, social progress would ensue. A critical component of this competition is that the fittest survive and the unfit do not. Accordingly, the unemployed are not only to blame for their failure to find jobs, but they are unfit, a view that could be internalized in workers' minds, prompting them to blame themselves. Those with high paying jobs could look upon those with low pay and the unemployed as unfit losers. Like laissez-faire economic thought, Social Darwinism suggests that creating income support for the jobless would be counterproductive and impede social progress. This theory served as a powerful force countering demands for social reforms. As historian Richard Hofstadler notes, although the ideas behind Social Darwinism were not new, they served to provide validation for laissez-faire ideology, giving "the force of a [new] natural law to the idea of competitive struggle" (1992, 6).

[13]Curiously, Marxist theorists of imperialism such as Vladimir Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg located the drive for imperialism in the need to counter a falling rate of profit in the domestic economy and paid little attention to its role in countering worker disgruntlement.

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VIII. The Threat of Nationalism Overdone

Pumping up the ideology of a foreign threat to gain peace from worker strife can be dangerous to the interests of elites if pushed so far as to contribute to the unleashing of major wars such as the twentieth century's two World Wars. The fact that workers suffered the greatest number of deaths and maiming generates widespread sympathy for their causes, especially when robust war demand for armaments generates huge profits for the owners of productive wealth. An instance of this sympathy and sense of fairness arose during World War I as the idea of conscripting income and wealth was put before the U.S. Congress. As one Congressman put it, "Let their dollars die for their country too" (quoted in Rosanvallon 2013, 187).

World War I witnessed a burgeoning of worker movements in its last years, especially as the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia inspired workers' parties and movements all across Europe. In Germany, the Spartacist uprising included a general strike and armed struggle. In Hungary the government was overthrown, and the Hungarian Soviet Republic was proclaimed. At the Peace Conference in March 1919, Lloyd George warned "All of Europe is in a revolutionary state of mind" (quoted in (Rosanvallon 2013, 188).[14] Union membership from the war's beginning to its end doubled in Great Britain, tripled in Germany, and Quadrupled in France, resulting in substantial egalitarian reforms. The state was substantially transformed from an instrument in service to elites to a force for democratic social progress.

In the United States, entry into the First World War led the federal government to create the National War Labor Board to solve labor disputes, and this, in turn, facilitated a dramatic expansion of unionization and the implementation of pro-labor reforms such as shop committees to resolve workplace disputes and higher wages and standards for working hours (Montgomery 1984).

However, by the war's end, in the U.S, forces were in motion to restore the persuasiveness of the elite's ideology. Labor's failure to fulfill its informal wartime "no strike" pledge was depicted as unpatriotic, just when the Russian Bolsheviks were introducing an alternative to capitalism.[15] Sympathy for workers lessened and the ideology of nationalism again became serviceable to the elite. In a "Red Scare" environment, labor's struggles were increasingly portrayed as part of a foreign communist conspiracy to turn the United States into the Western version of the Soviet Union. Business interests embarked on a campaign to demonstrate the patriotism of business and the dangers inherent in labor's intransigence. The Bolshevik Revolution's creation of a socialist society gave the rich the leverage needed to delegitimate anything critical of free-market capitalism. The "Red Scare" between 1917 and 1920 was used to purge leftist thinkers and tarnish movements for greater social equality. Progressives were branded as foreign-directed, godless, and a threat to all that Americans hold dear. The labor movement was associated with Bolshevism and foreign agitation, as "employers...were brought to the realization that the issue of radicalism could be helpful in their fight against unionism" (Murray 1955, 67). During the 1920s, union membership plunged from five to three million and inequality soared. Further, as historian Emily Pope-Obeda notes, "throughout the First Red Scare, immigrants were among the most central, and most visible victims of the zealous crusade to square the perceived growth of radicalism across the United States" (2019, 32).

Fear of Bolshevism was accompanied by riots and lynchings of black workers throughout the U.S. in what became known as the Red Summer. Black workers were frequently painted as Bolshevik agents or sympathizers (Hodges 2019). At its peak in the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan claimed as members one of every six eligible Americans -- the country's largest private organization. As historian Robert Murray points out, "the widespread propaganda activities of the various patriotic and conservative pressure groups paid off handsomely" (1955, 166) to elites as labor was busted and inequality boomed.

This pattern was repeated a quarter century later. As labor historian Melvyn Dubofsky put it, World War Two's coming "resolved the contradictions of American capitalism and substituted patriotic unity for class conflict" (1986, 213). However, while the war generated strong support for workers, in its aftermath, conservative interests re-invigorated the ideology of nationalism with renewed focus on the Soviet threat. The most extreme domestic consequence was another Red Scare fueling McCarthyism. Between 1947 and 1956, a Federal Government loyalty

[14]The assumption of political power by the Bolsheviks meant that the 'specter of communism' was no longer simply a possibility. In a review of John Maynard Keynes' *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, Veblen wrote that "... the central and most binding provision of the Treaty (and of the League [of Nations]) is an unrecorded clause by which the governments of the Great Powers are banded together for the suppression of Soviet Russia.... Bolshevism is a menace to absentee ownership; and in the light of events in Soviet Russia it became evident, point by point, that only with the definitive suppression of Bolshevism and all its works, at any cost, could the world be made safe for that Democracy of Property Rights on which the existing political and civil order is founded" (1920, 468, 470).

[15]Between 1915 and 1918 in the U.S., the number of work stoppages tripled and strikes "raged with singular intensity" in the munitions and armaments industry (Dubofsky 1996, 129), resulting in a ten percent fall in labor productivity (Brody 1993, 12). A particularly significant blow to labor's power came with the breaking of a strike in the steel industry in 1919.

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program screened 5 million federal workers, 2,700 employees were dismissed and about 12,000 resigned (Storrs, 2013). Loyalty tests spread to state and local governments as well as private enterprises, including, most notoriously, the entertainment industry. As historian Landon Storrs highlights, the Red Scare served "in defense of class, religious, and racial hierarchies" (2013, 6).

IX. Nationalism and U.S. Presidential Elections since 2016

In the U.S., inequality soared for 40 years prior to the presidential election of 2016, accompanied by stagnant wages and rising job insecurity. Americans appeared to be fed up with both the traditional Republican and Democratic parties, both of which did little to stem the flow of income, wealth, and privilege to an elite.[16] Two unorthodox candidates for the nominations of their parties gained attention by promising something different. Bernie Sanders on the left identified the problem as domestically generated inequality. Donald Trump identified the problem as predominantly foreign, due to free trade, immigration, and highlighting the supposed danger of Muslims.[17] Trump's rise thrived on the same form of malaise that had fueled the rise of fascism in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, witnessing, for instance, voter support for the German Nazi Party rising from two percent in 1928 to 33 percent a mere five years later (Fuchs 2018, 37).[18] Out of fear of the left and communism, wealthy elites gave support to fascists.

Trump's movement has metastasized into a white nationalist cause, with his support being most closely associated with notions of racial resentment and white nationalism (Graham et al. 2021). The Trump Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 that disproportionately benefited the rich is testimony to the manner in which his nationalism of "Make American Great Again" has served the interest of wealthy elites. The Republican Party supports the interests of rich elites and accordingly strongly supports Trump's candidacy for the forthcoming Presidential election of 2024, and appears untroubled that Trump exhibits authoritarian inclinations.

Similar social conditions in much of Europe are also fueling surges in nationalist ideology that deflects worker attention from their exploitation to foreign enemies expressed as immigrants and unfair foreign economic competition.

It should be noted that elites always oppose democracy. In principle, democracy empowers non-elites with the overwhelming majority of votes to peacefully use the political process to better their condition, or even dramatically reduce or even eliminate inequality in wealth, income, and privilege. For this reason, as inequality has exploded worldwide over the past half century and provided elites with greater political power and interests to protect, more nations have experienced weakening democracy than strengthening democracy (Herre and Roser 2023). As their work and life conditions have deteriorated over the past 50 years, many non-elites have also lost confidence that democracy is in their best interests. Legal scholar Ronald Daniels reports that in the U.S., "the fraction of citizens who report being dissatisfied with democracy now stands at a record high of 55 percent" (2021, 94).

X. Final Reflections

Humans evolved to more tightly bond together in groups and cede authority to a chosen leader when threatened by external enemies. This behavior was selected because it enhanced the group's survival. With the rise of states and civilization, rulers could augment their power by exploiting this behavior. They could even provoke enemies or fabricate the illusion of their existence to unify populations behind their rule and justify suppressing freedoms.

[16]The straw that broke the camel's back was Barack Obama's bailing out of the mega banks following the financial crisis of 2008, rather than nationalizing them, saving their wealthy owners from massive losses, while letting poor homeowners go bankrupt on loans they were fraudulently sold. A large percent of voters who had voted for Obama voted for Trump in 2016 (Wisman 2020).

[17]This malaise has been widespread in the developed world. Political scientist Kendred Winecoff writes that

> "In contrast to Canada, in many countries… 'left behind' voters perceive a 'dual violation' of the social contract. They at once see rich urban elites seemingly profit excessively from the processes of globalization. At the same time, they see movements of people over which the government seems no longer willing or able to control—whether the movement of Mexican labourers to the U.S., the free movement of workers in Europe, or the arrival anywhere of refugees fleeing conflict, economic stagnation, and other intolerable situations at home. Left without trust in those profiting from globalization (the "elites", as it were), parties seeming to aid and abet such profiting, or in government institutions failing to adequately regulate movement of people into their societies, they vote to sanction those who cheated and broke the social contract. In short, they vote to restore what they view as the proper moral order" (2016).

[18]Hitler promised to make Germany a "kingdom of power, greatness and glory" as Trump would later promise to "make America great again" (Fuchs 2018, 41).

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Those scholars who view nationalism as always an ideology typically use the term ideology in a class-neutral sense. This article claims that a more useful definition is to identify ideology as those doctrines that legitimate an elite's exploitation of subalterns. Following this meaning, nationalism is not necessarily an ideology. In a hostile world of warring states, nationalism can augment the social solidarity that better enables survival of the collectivity. Nationalism serves as ideology when it deflects the attention of the exploited from their exploitation by collapsing class discord into a collective of all of us together against foreign threats, whether military, economic, or cultural.

Consequently, it is not surprising that nationalism has come to be intensely used as ideology when workers have gained the capacity to threaten the elite's state with first violence and then, upon gaining the franchise, with their voting muscle. Nationalism is not the only ideology that legitimates the elite's privileged status. But it is an especially powerful and dangerous one that can result in devastating wars.

Not only does exploding inequality in most of the world induce stronger nationalist ideology that can lead to war, it also increases support among the wealthy for totalitarian government as they increasingly fear that workers will support redistributive legislation. In an empirical study, historian Frederick Solt finds that "across the countries and over time, where economic inequality is greater, nationalist sentiments are substantially more widespread" (2011, 828). The future of democracy hangs in the balance.

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